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ABSTRACT
Preliminary algebraic analysis of the ZUC cipher indicates
that the cipher may be vulnerable to algebraic attack. In
this paper we present an alternative algebraic analysis method
for the ZUC stream cipher, using a combiner to represent
the nonlinear function. This approach can recover the ini-
tial state of ZUC from an observed 297 words of keystream,
with a complexity of 2282 operations. This method is partic-
ularly successful when applied to a modified version of ZUC,
where the number of output words per clock is increased.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The ZUC stream cipher [8] is designed for use in China
as a standard for fourth generation mobile phones. It is
a word based stream cipher with a word size of 32-bits. The
keystream generator is based on a single 16-stage register,
where each stage contains 31 bits. The inputs to the cipher
are a key (k) and Initialization Vector (IV ), each of size 128-
bits (4 words), and the output is a 32-bit keystream word.
The structure of the ZUC keystream generator consists of
three layers: a linear feedback shift register (LFSR), a bit
reorganization layer and a nonlinear function f . The sec-
ond and third layers can be considered as a nonlinear filter
applied to the LFSR. Besides generating keystream to be
used for encryption, the keystream of ZUC can also be used
to generate a 32-bit Message Authentication Code (MAC).
The algorithms making use of the ZUC keystreams for en-
cryption and for authentication are referred to as 128-EEA3
and 128-EIA3, respectively [7, 9].
Algebraic analyses of ZUC are given in [9, 1, 11]. The al-
gebraic approach taken in these papers is straightforward
and involves finding direct relationships between the inter-
nal state bits of ZUC and the observed keystream bits. In
this paper, we take a different approach and establish rela-
tionships between the internal state bits and the keystream
bits indirectly. This analysis involves considering the non-
linear filter as a combiner with four input words and two
output words: two input words from the LFSR, and two in-
puts words from the internal memory states. The algebraic
attack based on these relationships requires 297 words of ob-
served keystream and 2282 operations to recover the initial
state bits of the shift register.
The paper is organized as follows. A brief description of
the algebraic attack is presented in Section 2. Section 3 de-
scribes ZUC stream cipher. The existing algebraic attack
analysis on ZUC is described in Section 4. Our algebraic
attack analysis of ZUC is given in Section 5. Section 6 con-
cludes this paper.
2. ALGEBRAIC ATTACK
Algebraic attacks on symmetric ciphers were first applied to
block ciphers in 2002 [6] and then to stream ciphers in 2003
[5]. On stream ciphers, the attacks involve two main stages
[4]. In the first stage, the analyst establishes multivariate re-
lations of low degree between either the key or the internal
state values and the output keystream. In the second stage,
the observed keystream is used to replace the variables de-
noting the keystream outputs z0, z1, ... to obtain a system of
multivariate equations. Finally, solving this system of equa-
tions permits recovery of the key or internal state values,
respectively. The complexity of solving the system of equa-
tions depends on the amount of keystream required, which
is determined by the number of equations generated.
For ease of analysis, algebraic attacks are often performed
by describing the cipher state and keystream in terms of bit
values, regardless of whether the cipher is bit-based or word-
based. The cipher functions, at the bit level, are described
in terms of the XOR and AND bit operations (addition and
multiplication over GF(2) respectively). This approach has
been applied in this paper.
The relationship between either key bits or internal state bits
and the output bits can be obtained directly or indirectly for
the nonlinear components that generate the keystream out-
put. Direct relationships are obtained by building mathe-
matical models of the nonlinear components, where the out-
put bits are presented as functions of the input bits. Indirect
relationships are obtained by considering the input and out-
put bits of the nonlinear components together and finding
valid relationships among them. In either case, the output
of this first stage is a system of multivariate equations of a
certain degree.
In the second stage, solving the equations, a prefix operation
can be applied. The aim of this operation is to reduce the
degree of the equations to increase the efficiency of finding a
solution. A reduction in degree can be achieved by finding
low degree multiples of the output nonlinear function that
generates the keystream. Alternatively, relabeling of vari-
ables can be used, although this reduces the degree of the
equations at the expense of increasing the number of vari-
ables. Linearization is a technique which involves replacing
each high degree term in an equation with a single term, and
the introduction of these new variables enables the equation
system to be translated to a linear system. Guessing some
key or state bits that occur in many high degree terms can
also be used to reduce the degree of the equations, but this
simultaneously increases the total complexity of the attack.
In any case, once the system of equations is prepared, an
attempt is made to find a solution. The output of this stage
is the recovery of the unknown key or internal state bits,
respectively.
Solving the system of equations may be simple if they are lin-
ear, or easily linearized. The eXtended Linearization (XL)
algorithm [2] described below may be applied to obtain this.
Another approach is to use Gro¨bner bases [10]; essentially
transforming the set F of polynomials that describe the re-
lationships into another set G of polynomials with certain
properties such that F and G generate the same output, but
where G is a low degree function.
2.1 XL Algorithm
The XL algorithm was proposed in 2000 as a means for
solving overdefined quadratic systems [2], and adapted for
equations of higher degree in 2002 [3]. The idea of the XL
algorithm is to multiply the initial system of equations in n
variables with maximum degree d by all possible monomials
of degree up to d. If the degree of a resulting equation is
equal or less than d, then this new equation is added to the
system. After this the linearization approach is applied to
the resulting system of equations. Let T denote the number
of monomials in the system up to degree d. Then T is given
by T =
∑d
i=0
(
n
i
)
.
The complexity of the XL algorithm depends on the elim-
ination technique used. Strassen’s algorithm [12] is widely
applied for this purpose, requiring about 7 · T log27 opera-
tions.
3. DESCRIPTION OF ZUC STREAM CIPHER
The internal state of ZUC [8] consists of a 16 stage LFSR
(s0, . . . , s15) and two internal memory states R1 and R2,
with each register stage containing 31 bits and each memory
state containing 32 bits. Thus the total internal state size is
560 bits. The structure of ZUC can be considered as three
layers: the LFSR, a bit reorganization layer which takes 16
bits from each of 8 different stages of the LFSR to form four
32-bit words, and a nonlinear function f , which uses two 32-
bit words from the bit reorganization layer and the contents
of the two memory stages Rt1 and R
t
2 to generate two new
values Rt+11 and R
t+1
2 . The second and third layer can be
considered together as a NonLinear Filter (NLF) applied to
the LFSR. The structure of the ZUC stream cipher is shown
in Figure 1. The two memory words are combined with a
word from the bit reorganization, X0, to generate a word
W used only during the initialization phase to update the
shift register. In the keystream generation phase these two
memory words are combined with two words from the bit
reorganization layer, X0 and X3 to generate the keystream
word Z.
3.1 Notation
The following notation will be used throughout this paper:
S0S1S2S3S4S5S6S7S8S9S10S11S12S13S14S15
1+28
32323232 X0 X1 X2 X3
Z
220221217215
(+)mod 231-1
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f
Figure 1: Structure of ZUC stream cipher
• ⊕: Exclusive OR.
• (≪ b): Rotation left by b bit positions.
• ( b): Shift right by b bit positions.
• +: Addition modulo(232).
• sti: The stage i at time t.
• ||: The concatenation of two bytes to form a 4-byte
(32-bit) word.
3.2 Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)
The ZUC keystream generator uses a 16-stage shift regis-
ter S, where each stage contains a 31 bit value. The val-
ues of each stage are restricted to 1, 2, 3, . . . , 231 − 1. The
state update function for the LFSR differs depending on
whether the cipher is in initialisation or keystream genera-
tion phase. In the initialisation phase, the update function
of the LFSR is not autonomous but uses the output word W
as shown in Figure 1 (including the dashed line) as discussed
in Section3.3). The updated process in initialisation phase
is as follows:
1. u = (215s15+2
17s13+2
21s10+2
20s4+(1+2
8)s0)mod(2
31−
1)
2. s16 = (u + (W  1))mod(231 − 1)
3. If s16 = 0, set s16 = 2
31 − 1
4. (s1, s2, . . . , s15, s16)→ (s0, s1, . . . , s14, s15)
In the keystream generation phase, the LFSR is autonomous
with state update function as follows:
1. s16 = (2
15s15+2
17s13+2
21s10+2
20s4+(1+2
8)s0)mod(2
31−
1)
2. If s16 = 0, set s16 = 2
31 − 1
3. (s1, s2, . . . , s15, s16)→ (s0, s1, . . . , s14, s15)
3.3 The NonLinear Filter (NLF)
The NLF takes as input four 32-bit words from the LFSR
denoted (X0, X1, X2, X3) as shown in Figure 1, and two
words from memory states R1 and R2. There are two layers
in NLF: bit reorganization and the nonlinear function f .
3.3.1 Bit reorganization
The bit reorganization layer extracts 128-bits from the state
of the LFSR to form four 32-bit words as follows: X0 =
s15H ||s14L, X1 = s11L||s9H , X2 = s7L||s5H and X3 = s2L||s0H ,
where siH and siL are the 16 most significant bits and 16
least significant bits of stage i respectively. The two words
Xt1 and X
t
2 are used by the nonlinear function f to update
the two 32-bit words Rt1 and R
t
2. The other two words X
t
0
and Xt3 are used by NLF to generate the output word Z.
3.3.2 The nonlinear function f
The nonlinear function f uses four words as input: Xt1, X
t
2,
Rt1 and R
t
2. Two output words R1 and R2 are produced as
shown in Figure 1. The two intermediate words are used
W1 and W2 in the nonlinear function f as follow: W1 =
R1 +X1, W2 = R2⊕X2, R1 = S(L1(W1L||W2H)) and R2 =
S(L2(W2L||W1H)), where S is a (32× 32) SBox and L1 and
L2 are linear transformations.
The (32×32) SBox used in ZUC is composed of four (8×8)
Sboxes S = (S0, S1, S2, S3) , where S0 = S2 and S1 = S3.
In order to use this construction the input word to the SBox
is divided into four 8 bit subwords. Each of these is input
to one of Sboxes.
These two Sboxes S0 and S1 have the following properties.
The algebraic degree for S0 and S1 are 5 and 7 respectively.
The highest probability of differential characteristic for S0
and S1 are 2
−5 and 2−6 respectively. The highest bias of lin-
ear characteristic for S0 and S1 are 2
−3 and 2−4 respectively.
The number of linear independent quadratic equations that
can be establish by S0 and S1 are 11 and 39 respectively [1,
11].
The linear transforms L1 and L2 transform a 32-bit word in
the following way:
L1(X) = X⊕(X≪ 2)⊕(X≪ 10)⊕(X≪ 18)⊕(X≪ 24)
L2(X) = X⊕(X≪ 8)⊕(X≪ 14)⊕(X≪ 22)⊕(X≪ 30)
3.4 Initialisation phase
The initialisation phase takes as input the 128-bit secret key
k, a 128-bit IV v and a 240-bit constant value D. Con-
sider both k and v as the concatenation of 16 bytes, so
k = k0||k1|| . . . ||k15 and v = v0||v1|| . . . ||v15, respectevely.
Similarly, consider D as the concatenation of 16 15-bit values
as D = d0||d1|| . . . ||d15. To begin, the register and memories
are loaded as follows.
1. Set si = ki||di||vi for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15
2. Set the memory cells R1 and R2 to 0.
3. Following this, 32 iterations of the initialisation state
update function (as outlined in Section 3.2) are per-
formed.
3.5 Keystream generation phase
Once initialisation phase is completed, keystream for keystream
generation phase is generated one word at time t, Zt, as fol-
lows:
Zt = ((Xt0 ⊕Rt1) + Rt2)⊕Xt3 (1)
The LFSR state update function during keystream gener-
ation is as outlined in Section 3.2. The first word of the
keystream generated is discarded and other words are used
to encrypt the plaintext or decrypt the ciphertext or for au-
thentication purposes to generate a 32-bit MAC tag.
4. EXISTING ALGEBRAIC ANALYSIS OF
ZUC
In this section we review the work in [1, 9, 11] that applies di-
rect relationship to emphasis the algebraic relations between
the initial state bits and the output keystream bits. From
the description of the ZUC stream cipher, the three differ-
ent main operations in the structure of ZUC are addition
and multiplication in the finite field Fp, where p = 231 − 1,
addition in the ring Z232 , and the word XORing. Besides
these, the cipher also makes use of the SBox and the linear
transformation on the bit level.
4.1 Relating modular addition to the XOR op-
eration
Let z = x + y modp, be elements of the field Fp, where
p = 231 − 1, and x = x30x29 . . . x1x0, y = y30y29 . . . y1y0,
z = z30z29 . . . z1z0 be its binary expression. Then we have
the following:
z0 = x0 ⊕ y0 ⊕ c0
z1 = x1 ⊕ y1 ⊕ c1
...
z30 = x30 ⊕ y30 ⊕ c30
where ci = xi−1yi−1⊕ (xi−1⊕yi−1)ci−1 for (1 ≤ i ≤ 31) are
the carry bits and c0 is calculated by substituting i as 31
instead of 0. Then to have a full description of the addition
in the field Fp, the carry bits are eliminated from the above
equations, to have the following equations:
z0 = x0 ⊕ y0 ⊕ x30y30 ⊕ (x30 ⊕ y30)(x30 ⊕ y30 ⊕ z30)
z1 = x1 ⊕ y1 ⊕ x0y0 ⊕ (x0 ⊕ y0)(x0 ⊕ y0 ⊕ z0)
...
z30 = x30 ⊕ y30 ⊕ x29y29 ⊕ (x29 ⊕ y29)(x29 ⊕ y29 ⊕ z29)
The above equations involve the input and output bits in the
quadratic terms. To have the output bits zi in linear form,
the degree of the equations will increase as the indexes i
increase.
Similarly, let z = x + y mod(232) be elements of the ring
Z232 , and x = x31x30 . . . x1x0, y = y31y10 . . . y1y0, z =
z31z30 . . . z1z0 be its binary expression. Then we have the
following:
z0 = x0 ⊕ y0
z1 = x1 ⊕ y1 ⊕ c1
...
z31 = x31 ⊕ y31 ⊕ c31
where c1 = x0y0 and ci = xi−1yi−1 ⊕ (xi−1 ⊕ yi−1)ci−1
for (1 < i ≤ 31) are the carry bits. Then to have a full
description of the addition in the ring Z232 , the carry bits are
eliminated from the above equations, to have the following
equations:
z0 = x0 ⊕ y0
z1 = x1 ⊕ y1 ⊕ x0y0
z2 = x2 ⊕ y2 ⊕ x1y1 ⊕ (x1 ⊕ y1)(x1 ⊕ y1 ⊕ z1)
...
z31 = x31 ⊕ y31 ⊕ x30y30 ⊕ (x30 ⊕ y30)(x30 ⊕ y30 ⊕ z30)
In similar way, the algebraic equations can be established
for the case of modulo p addition for c inputs. In the case of
ZUC, there are six (c = 6) inputs involved in the feedback of
the LFSR which are the states s15, s13, s10, s4, s0 (two times
s0 is input to the feedback) and so the output state s16 have
algebraic degree 6.
The two SBoxes used in the nonlinear function f have alge-
braic immunity of order 2. To establish equations between
the input and the output, the degree of the equations will
be 2.
The total internal state of ZUC is 560 bits and the cipher
generates at each clock 32 bits of output. Each output
bit raises an equation between the input internal state and
the output keystream bits. To recover the secret internal
states bits using an algebraic attacks, a system of equa-
tions should be developed. The minimum keystream require-
ment to construct this system will be 18 keystream words
(d560 \ 32e = 18).
4.2 Constructing equations over F2
From the specification of the ZUC stream cipher, we can see
that the update function of the LFSR involves five stages
and raises algebraic equations of degree 6 for updating state
s16, since the state S0 appears twice. This state (s16) is
input to the nonlinear function f through the variable X1
after four clocks. There are two nonlinear operations in the
nonlinear function: addition modulo 232 and the application
of the SBox.
If s16 is eliminated from the system of equation, then the
degree of equations of the whole system will increase to 8.
The number of variables T in the system of equations to
recover the secret states will be:
T = 16× 31 + 18× 2× 32 = 1648
This system of equations can be solved using the lineariza-
tion method with complexity of:(
T
8
)2.37
≈ 2166
If the output of the LFSR feedback computation is con-
sidered as new variables, and the algebraic equations for
the LFSR states are of degree 6, then the total number
of variables T under the assumption that only 18 words of
keystream will be used in this system will be:
T = 16× 31 + 17× 31 + 18× 2× 32 = 2175
The complexity of solving this system using linearization
method will be: (
T
6
)2.37
≈ 2135
The last analysis is that if the new variables are introduced
and a system of equation of algebraic degree 2 is developed
for the states. Then the computation of LFSR feedback will
be as follows:
y1 = (1 + 2
8)s0modp
y2 = 2
20s4 + y1modp
y3 = 2
21s10 + y2modp
y4 = 2
17s13 + y3modp
s16 = 2
15s15 + y4modp
From the above equations, 93 independent algebraic equa-
tions can be generated from each equation of degree 2. Thus,
the total number of independent algebraic equations of de-
gree 2 that can be generated from the LFSR feedback com-
putation will be 93 × 5 = 465. For the nonlinear function
f , it is possible to generate algebraic equations of degree 2.
It can be establish that 93 independent algebraic equations
from the modular addition operation and the SBoxes S0 and
S1 can generate 11 and 39 independent equation of degree 2
respectively. Thus, ZUC stream cipher can form a system of
algebraic equation of degree 2 and the number of variables
that can be establish under the assumption of observing only
18 words of keystream will be:
T = 16× 31 + 2× 32− 1 + 17(5× 31 + 3× 32− 2) = 4792
The number of equations m of degree 2 will be:
m = 93 + 17(93× 5 + 2× 93 + 39 + 11) = 12010
This system can be solved using XL algorithm, since the lin-
earisation method is not effective, and the estimated com-
plexity using XL algorithm will be:(
T
T√
m
)2.37
≈ 2830
Practically, the number of independent equations is much
smaller than the number of variables if linearization method
is used, and hence the keystream words requirement to solve
the system is more than 18. So this will increase the number
of intermediate variables and also will increase the complex-
ity of solving the system. Thus solving the equations in this
way is far worse than the exhaustive key search which is cost
2128 operations.
5. OUR ALGEBRAIC ATTACK ANALYSIS
ON ZUC
In this section we apply a different type of algebraic attack
to ZUC. This attack investigates the relationship between
the input states of the cipher with the output using indi-
rect relations. A direct relation cannot be easily formed for
this cipher due to the complexity of the nonlinear function
f . However, it may be possible to find indirect relations
through the use of a combiner. Valid relation can be found
by using a matrix to represent the combiner. The rows of
the matrix represent the input bits of the combiner and the
memory bits if any. The columns represent all the monomi-
als in the variables of the inputs and outputs of the com-
biner, up to certain degree without the memory bits. Then
the output relation is applied to T number of clocks without
increasing the degree of the equation due to the linearity of
the update function. These relations will form a system of
equations which is used to recover the unknowns (the initial
state bits in our case) by observing corresponding values of
the keystream bits and substituting their values in the sys-
tem of equations.
5.1 Building relations for NLF
The NLF of ZUC at time t takes four 32-bit words from
different stages of the shift register to generate one 32-bit
word of keystream Zt during the keystream generation, as
shown in Figure 1. Two words X1 and X2 are inputs to the
nonlinear function f . The output of f is the two words R1
and R2 which are used with the other two words of the input
stages X0 and X3 to generate the output keystream word
Zt as shown in equation 1.
We start our analysis by considering the NLF as a combiner
with enclosed dash line shown in Figure 2. The aim of this
combiner is to find relationship between the input bits from
the states of the shift register and the output keystream bits.
There are four input words to the combiner which are from
the states of shift register and one output word which is the
keystream word.
To find a valid relation we have to construct a matrix for the
combiner. The rows of the matrix represent the input bits
of the words Xt0, X
t
1, X
t
2 and X
t
3. The columns represent
all monomials up to degree d in the 128-bits of state input
and the 32 bits of the output word Zt. To find the degree d,
equation 2 should be satisfied such that the minimum value
of degree d is selected.
2Mm ·
d∑
i=0
(
Mc
i
)
> 2Mc+l (2)
S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 
1+28 
32 32 32 32 X0 X1 X2 X3 
Z 
220 221 217 215 
(+)mod 231-1 
W2 W1 
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W1L W2H W2L W1H 
 L2 
SBox 
 L1 
SBox 
R2 R1 
Figure 2: NLF combiner
where M represents consecutive steps of forming the com-
biner, c, m, and l represent number of the input bits, the
output bits and the memory bits respectively.
The minimum degree that satisfies equation 2 is 30 for M
=1. The value of the degree is very high and it is not prac-
tical. So we have to see other combiner to minimize the
degree of the equation.
Now we will consider the nonlinear function f as a combiner
with memory. This combiner has two words of input Xt1 and
Xt2, two words of memory R
t−1
1 and R
t−1
2 and two words of
output Rt1 and R
t
2, as shown in Figure 3.
W1H W1L W2H W2L
W1L W2H W2L W1H
L2
SBox
L1
SBox
R2R1
R2R1 X1 X2
Memory
Combiner
R1
t-1 R2
t-1
X1
t X2
t
R1
t R2
t
R1
t-1 R2
t-1
Figure 3: ZUC NonLinear function f
To find a valid relation we have to construct a matrix for the
combiner. The rows of the matrix represent the input bits
of the words Xt1 and X
t
2 and the memory bits of the words
Rt−11 and R
t−1
2 . The columns represent all the monomials in
the variables of the inputs and outputs, up to certain degree
without the memory bits. The problem here is that the
memory bits are the same as the output bits. If we eliminate
the memory bits by using the output of the matrix relations
then in this case we also eliminate the output bits which
we need to find a valid relation between the input and the
output. This type of combiner is also not working due to
using the memory bits as the output bits.
To deal with this problem, we will consider the memory bits
as an input bits to the combiner. In this case there are four
input words to the combiner Xt1, X
t
2, R
t−1
1 and R
t−1
2 , and
two words of the output Rt1 and R
t
2 as shown in Figure 4.
To find a valid relation between the input bits and the output
bits of the combiner, a matrix A is constructed. The rows
represent all possible input bits to the combiner which are
2128. The columns represent all monomials up to degree d in
1
X1
t
X2
t
R1
t R2
t
R1
t-1 R2
t-1
2 X2
t+1
R1
t+1 R2
t+1
3
X1
t+2
X2
t+2
M
X1
t+M-1
X2
t+M-1
R1
t+M-2 R2
t+M-2
X1
t+1
R1
t+M-1 R2
t+M-1
Figure 4: Combiner of ZUC
the 128-bits of register inputs and the 64 bits of the output.
To find the degree d, equation 2 should be satisfied such that
the minimum value of degree d is selected.
The minimum degree that satisfies equation 2 is 16 for M =
1. So we have to consider all product monomials that can
be constructed for all degrees from 0 to 16. The number of
columns of this matrix A will be:
264 ·
16∑
i=0
(
128
i
)
∼= 2131 > 2128
Since the number of columns is greater than the number of
rows, at least one column must be a linear combination of
other columns. The linear dependencies can be efficiently
found by Gaussian elimination. So, we can construct equa-
tions of up to degree 16 that relate the input bits and the
output bits to the combiner.
The output equations relate the input words Xt1, X
t
2, R
t−1
1 , R
t−1
2
to the output Rt1, R
t
2 of the combiner. Then we use equation
1 to get the direct relationship between the input words of
the shift register and the output keystream words.
An attack will be considered significant if it require less than
2560 operations, since the size of the internal states of ZUC
is n = 560 bits. We have 560 unknowns in this system
representing the initial state of the 31 bits in each of the 16-
stages of the shift register and the two words of the memories
R1 and R2. This system can be solved by the XL algorithm
[3].
The number of monomials T in this system is given by:
T=
16∑
i=0
(
560
i
)
≈ 2102
Therefore, we would need to generate at least T equations
for all initial states to be recovered. This means that 2102
keystream word observations from a single key is required.
The complexity of this attack is
C = (7/64) · T log27 ≈ 2282
5.2 Algebraic attacks on modified version of
ZUC
In this section we analysis the modified version of the ZUC.
The modified version of ZUC considers the same inputs but
only the amount of the output is increased.
The new structure can be done by different ways, for ex-
ample, by considering the output of each SBox as an output
word after XORing it by one of the free words of the bit reor-
ganization word. We repeat the analysis for different values
of m and then calculate the minimum degree d that satisfies
equation 2, the keystream requirement and the complexity
of the attack.
Table 1 shows all the specifications of the attack for the
modified version of the ZUC stream cipher. In table 1, time
(step 1) represents the time requires for finding valid equa-
tions. Time (step 2) represents the time requires for solving
these equations effectively.
n= 496 , M=1, c=128(4 words)
m 32 64 65 80 100 120
d 30 16 15 11 5 2
Keystream bits 2162 299 295 274 238 217
Time(step 1) 2357 2357 2357 2357 2357 2357
Time(step 2) 2453 2278 2265 2206 2106 247
Table 1: Algebraic attack on ZUC
We see that the time required to find equations is same
for all numbers of output bits m. However, the keystream
bits requirement and the time require to solve the equations
decrease when the number of output bits m increased. This
means that the security of the ZUC cipher collapse when we
increase the number of output bits in order to increase the
speed of the cipher.
If we compare the results given in Table 1 with the results
done for Snow 2.0 in Table 3 in [4], we can see that the two
results are same. This means that the ZUC and Snow cipher
designs are optimal for the design output which is resistance
to this type of algebraic attack.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper presents an alternative method for applying an
algebraic attack to the ZUC stream cipher. An existing
method finds direct relations between the input and the out-
put keystream, but has been shown to be infeasible. The
method presented in this paper uses an indirect method and
considers the keystream generator as a combiner with mem-
ory to form the equations relating the inputs to the outputs.
Of the possibilities considered, only one is effective in deter-
mining equations for the nonlinear function f of the NLF.
The algebraic analysis is also applied to a modified version
of the ZUC stream cipher, where more output bits are pro-
duced at each clocking. This increases the throughput of
the cipher, but the analysis shows that the security of the
cipher is greatly reduced as a result.
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